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Statement of Jurisdiction

The district court entered judgment against Abisai Martinez-Castellanos
for several offenses, including two counts of third-degree-felony possession. A
copy of the judgment is attached. (Add. A.) This court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(e).
Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: Whether Martinez-Castellanos was denied the right to participate

in the jury-selection process to his detriment; and relatedly, whether counsel was
ineffective for failing to request that prospective jurors be dismissed for cause
and/ or for failing to remove them with peremptory strikes.
Issue 2: Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to make a motion to

suppress evidence based on an unlawful extension of a traffic stop.
Issue 3: Whether the district court erred in failing to ensure that Martinez-

Castellanos had the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the
proceedings, including during post-trial proceedings.

,

Preservation: The issues were not preserved. Martinez-Castellanos has

raised them under the plain-error and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrines.
Standard of Review: For plain error, an appellant must show obvious

error and prejudice. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1224 (Utah 1993). For ineffective
assistance of counsel, an appellant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient and prejudicial. State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ifl8, 321 P.3d 1136.

1
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•
Determinative Provisions
The following provisions are attached at Add. B: U.S. CONST. amend. IV,
VI, XIV; UTAH CONST. art. I,§§ 7, 12; Utah Code§ 77-1-6; Utah R. Crim. P. 17, 18.
Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition Below

In June 2010, the State charged Martinez-Castellanos with two felony
counts for possession of a controlled substance, one misdemeanor count for
possession of a weapon, one misdemeanor count for possession of drug
paraphernalia, and one misdemeanor count for driving with a measureable
amount of drugs in the body. 1 R.11-12. The case went to trial and the jury found
Martinez-Castellanos guilty of the drug and paraphernalia offenses, but not
guilty of the weapons offense. R.258-65.
Approximately a week later, the district court filed a sua sponte notice that
it was considering the possibility of granting a new trial because it was
concerned that Martinez-Castellanos received ineffective assistance of counsel
during the proceedings. R.268-69. While the court expressed concern based on
"two events in the history of this case," the court ultimately appointed an
attorney to present an amicus brief on one issue: whether defense counsel failed
to file a memorandum "following an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion
to suppress." R.268,274,279-86. After briefing, the court withdrew the sua sponte

1

The State dismissed a charge for possession of a prescription drug.
2

"
notice and proceeded with sentencing. R.291-95. Martinez-Castellanos' counsel
subsequently filed an unsupported Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, and the court denied the motion. R.296-97,394.
Martinez-Castellanos has timely appealed. He asserts that counsel was
ineffective during jury selection and in failing to address the extended level-two
detention; and the district court committed plain error when it failed to appoint
counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos in post-trial proceedings.
2.

Statement of Facts 2

The prosecution and defense each presented one witness to testify at trial:
the State called Trooper John Sheets and the defense called Martinez-Castellanos.
2.1

Trooper Sheets' Testimony

Trooper Sheets testified that on June 9, 2010, after completing a traffic stop
in the southbound lanes of traffic on 1-15 in Juab County, he saw an Acura
traveling northbound-in the opposite direction. Compare R.440:41-42 with
R.440:93-95. Although the trooper did not observe anything suspicious about the
Acura, he crossed the interstate median with emergency lights engaged and
accelerated to 110 mph to follow it. R.440:93-95.
When Sheets caught up to the Acura, he observed two things: the car had
California license plates and the rear plate had only one registration sticker.
R.440:44. According to Sheets, California law requires drivers to display two
The district court did not record some proceedings. R.450. Thus, the parties
stipulated to supplement the record with declarations. R.407,409-432,493-95.
2

.,

3
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stickers on the license plate: one for the month and one for the year. Id.
As the Acura pulled over, Sheets came to a stop behind it. He approached
the passenger-side window and asked Martinez-Castellanos for a license and
registration. R.440:45. Sheets testified that Martinez-Castellanos' speech and
movements were rapid. R.440:56-57,99. He thought Martinez-Castellanos might
be under the influence of "stimulants/' but he was not familiar with MartinezCastellanos; he did not know if this was his "normal way." R.436:8;440:56-57,99101 ("I don't know his personal traits" or "his personal speech"). 3
Martinez-Castellanos gave Trooper Sheets insurance and registration
information and an expired Colorado license. R.440:45. He told Sheets he had a
valid Utah license but did not have it with him. Id. Sheets took the information to
his patrol car and ran a driver's license, registration, and insurance check; and a
check for warrants. R.440:48. He determined that everything was in order. He
learned that Martinez-Castellanos had recently registered the car- in March
2010-but did not properly affix a sticker to the plate. R.440:45A8,148.
Sheets also ran a background check on Martinez-Castellanos for a criminal
history. R.440:48-49. The dispatcher reported that Martinez-Castellanos had
miscellaneous theft charges dating back to 1997; and charges for drug offenses in
2001 and 2006. R.460:4. In addition, Sheets learned that three years earlier, in

3

Sheets acknowledged that Martinez-Castellanos' behavior may be explained as
nervousness. R.440:102.
4

2007, authorities rearrested Martinez-Castellanos and revoked his probation due
to controlled substance possession. Id. The information "heightened" Trooper
Sheets' suspicions "that [Martinez-Castellanos] might be [under] the influence of
something." R.436:8.
Sheets returned to Martinez-Castellanos and asked him to step out of the
car for field-sobriety tests. R.440:57. He also asked about weapons. R.436:9-10.
Martinez-Castellanos described a knife in the center console. Id.
Sheets conducted field-sobriety tests, and Martinez-Castellanos "did fairly
well." R.440:56-65,101 .4 Notwithstanding, Sheets believed Martinez-Castellanos
was under the influence of controlled substances, and based on MartinezCastellanos' criminal history, Sheets believed he was a restricted person and was
not supposed to be in possession of any weapons. R.440:65. Sheets placed
Martinez-Castellanos under arrest in the patrol car and searched the Acura. Id.
During the search, Sheets recovered either two pocket knives or a knife
and a box cutter. R.440:66,143. He also recovered a lighter, a marijuana grinder, a

,
4

Sheets administered several tests. First, he conducted the horizontal gaze
nystagmus, which Martinez-Castellanos passed. R.440:57-59. Second, he
conducted the convergence eye test. Martinez-Castellanos' s eyes came into the
center for convergence and bounced "back out." R.440:59. Third, he administered
the Rohmberg test for eyelid tremors and the "count in." R.440:60-61. According
to Sheets, Martinez-Castellanos swayed "a little," his eyelids had some tremor,
and he was off "a little bit" on the count. R.440:61. Fourth, he administered "the
walk and tum." Id. Sheets testified that Martinez-Castellanos lost his balance "a
little" on his "third step." R.440:62. The fifth test was the one-leg stand. Id.
Martinez-Castellanos "didn't do too poorly on that." R.440:63. Sixth, Sheets took
Martinez-Castellanos' pulse. It was 108 beats per minute, and according to
Sheets, the faster rate may have been due to nervousness. R.440:64,102.
5

"

•
glass pipe, a wrapper with pills, and a "white crystal substance" that later tested
positive for methamphetamine. R.436:18-19;440:65-84. The trooper transported
Martinez-Castellanos to the jail and obtained a warrant for a blood draw.
R.440:84-87. The crime lab prepared an analysis that showed positive for "THC
metabolite" or marijuana. R.440:88-89. Sheets testified that a marijuana
metabolite may remain in the system for 30 days after drug use. R.440:121.
2.2

Martinez-Castellanos' Testimony

On June 9, 2010, Martinez-Castellanos was driving northbound on I-15
from California to attend his brother's graduation in Utah. R.411,427. Just before
leaving, Martinez-Castellanos completed a 9 or 10-hour shift at work. R.411. He
traveled all night, and had been on the road for twelve or more hours. Id. He
drank energy drinks to stay awake. R.426,440:139.
Martinez-Castellanos suffered from back problems. R.410; 440:132. He
obtained a prescription in California for medical marijuana. R.440:133. His doctor
told him to wait 6-8 hours after using marijuana before driving. R.440:134.
Martinez-Castellanos admitted that he smoked marijuana a few days before
leaving for Utah, and he thought he could drive because he had waited as
directed. Id. Also, he admitted that the marijuana grinder and lighter in the car
belonged to him; and the knife in the car's center console belonged to him. R.42526;440:137, 143-44. He denied knowing anything about other items in the Acura.
R.410,425,440:143-44.

6

Martinez-Castellanos explained that he purchased the car from a
dealership about a month before his trip and intended to give it to his brother for
graduation. R.426-27. Apparently he was mistaken about when he had
purchased the car: he purchased it three months earlier, in March 2010.
R.440:142,148. Also, he paid $400 in cash for the car. R.426. The salesman told

-

him the Acura was recently brought in and had not been cleaned. Id. In fact, the
car was cluttered with trash. R.425-26. Martinez-Castellanos bought the car
anyway, and registered it. R.426-27;440:9. He did not have time to clean it before
his trip. Id. When Trooper Sheets stopped him on I-15, Martinez-Castellanos was
surprised to learn he was missing a sticker on his license plate. R.460:3.
3.

Jury Selection
The case went to trial, and the district court circulated juror questionnaires,

which more than 20 people completed. R.440:2-4. Thereafter, in open court, the
court asked the venire members preliminary background questions. R.431,440:421. The court then invited counsel "to join [him] back in chambers" to address

,

follow-up questions for venire members. R.440:21. Martinez-Castellanos was not
invited to participate in that portion of the proceedings. Id.; R.416-17,431.
While in chambers, the district court asked the attorneys if they had
questions for anyone on the list of prospective jurors. R.416-17. If they did, the
court called those prospective jurors into chambers for questioning. Id.; see also
R.431. After questioning, the court generally asked each prospective juror ifs/he

7

•
could be fair and impartial. Id. The court then excused that individual, and
typically asked whether the attorneys had concerns with that person serving on
the jury and whether the attorneys passed the juror for cause. R.416,431.
In all, the district court invited 13 individuals in chambers for questioning.
R.412-16. At the conclusion of the process, the attorneys returned to the
courtroom and exchanged the jury list to exercise peremptory strikes. R.412,428.
Defense counsel exercised four strikes- against Jeffrey Bradley, Kert Stevens,
Ryan Greenhalgh, and Gary Wood - although he could not recall why. R.428.
Also, counsel did not recall having any conversation with Martinez-Ca~tellanos
about the jury-selection process or involving him in the process. R.428,431.
Before announcing the names of the eight individuals who would serve on
the jury, the court asked the prosecution and defense whether the listed
individuals "constitute[d] the jury [they each] selected." R.440:24. Both answered
in the affirmative. Id. The court then announced the following individuals to
serve on the jury: Paul Mangelson, Carolyn Sachra, Phil Sperry, Stacey Prevost,
Rodney Steele, Lucy Jones, Chet Farr, and Mitchell Durbin. Id.
For purposes of this appeal, the in-chambers voir dire proceedings relating
to three of the impaneled jurors warrants further discussion.
3.1

Paul Mangelson

The prosecution and defense counsel were familiar with Mangelson.
R.415,430. He served as a trooper in drug interdiction along 1-15 for several years
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before he retired. See Myrna Trauntvein, Sgt. Paul Mangelson retires from the UHP

after 40 years, NEPHI TIMES NEWS (Dec. 21, 2005), www.nephitimesnews.com/
1205/122105/2.htrn. He did not disclose that information in his questionnaire or
during general questioning in the courtroom. See R.440:9;461 at 2 (answering
"yes," without more, when asked about work in law enforcement). The court
called him in chambers for questioning because of concerns about his experience
in drug interdiction and his involvement in jury trials. Id. Mangelson disclosed
that he knew Sheets; he assured the attorneys and court that he "could be fair"
and "would make up his mind based on the facts"; and he stated he would "not
give the officer's testimony any more weight" than the other witnesses. Id.
After the in-chambers questioning, defense counsel did not strike
Mangelson from the jury because, as a former prosecutor, defense counsel
believed Mangelson would hear the evidence about the stop and "know that it
was not proper." R.429. Mangelson ultimately served as foreman . R.440:205.
3.2

Carolyn Sachra

Carolyn Sachra revealed in chambers that she had been a victim of rape;
she was against drugs; and "if a person had drugs in the car, they were probably
guilty." R.415,428-29. No one objected to her service on the jury. Id.
3.3

Lucy Jones

Lucy Jones disclosed that she was either related to or close friends with the
Nephi City Chief of Police. R.413. While in chambers, she "was quite reluctant to

9
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disclose what was going on in her own mind." R.429. The court asked if she
could be fair and impartial and she expressed "reservations about her ability to
function as a juror." Id. The trial court asked her the same question a second
time, and she replied that "she understood what the judge wanted" and
"believed she could serve as a juror." Id. No one objected to her service. Id.
4.

Post-Trial Proceedings

After the trial, the district court filed a sua sponte notice regarding a new
trial. R.267-68. In addition, the court called the parties in chambers and expressed
concern that Martinez-Castellanos may have received ineffective assistance at
trial. R.268,422-23. The court initially identified two potential issues, 5 but focused
only on the extended traffic stop in light of the evidence presented at trial. R.268.
The court stated that Sheets may have unlawfully "expanded the scope of the
stop beyond what was permissible" by asking Martinez-Castellanos to step out
of the car for field-sobriety tests. R.422. Based on the trial testimony, "there [was]
at least an arguable basis to have pursued defendant's motion to suppress" and
5

The district court also expressed concern that Martinez-Castellanos may have
received ineffective assistance because defense counsel failed to challenge or
remove Mangelson from the jury and failed to ask adequate follow-up questions.
R.268,421,429-30. The court abandoned that issue, citing to State v. Smith, 2012 UT
App 338, 291 P.3d 869. But that case is distinguishable. There, a juror answered
"no" in the jury questionnaire when asked if she could weigh the evidence fairly
and without prejudice and she referenced her teaching duties at the jail. Id. ,rs.
During follow-up questioning,.she specified that she did not know whether
teaching presented a conflict, and she gave answers supporting impartiality. Id.
,r,r12-13. The court of appeals ruled the facts did not support a level of bias for
challenging the juror: "To the contrary, [her] volunteer work at the jail" may
have made her "favorably predisposed to the defense." Id. i!l3.
10

defense counsel "failed to do [so]." R.268. The court ruled it would appoint
conflict counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos in the post-trial proceedings,
but then appointed Tate Bennett to file an amicus brief. R.274,279-86.
Bennett did not address the extended detention or the evidence. R.279-86.
Instead, he filed a memorandum identifying the two-part analysis for ineffective

,,

assistance of counsel and the burdens of the parties in briefing suppression
issues. Id. Bennett believed the district court's earlier denial of the motion to
suppress was sufficient to include" an implicit determination that the facts
elicited at the evidentiary hearing" supported a lawful search, R.279, even
though the earlier ruling was made without the benefit of argument from the
defense and did not address the trial evidence or the lawfulness of the extended
detention, and did not include findings. R.57,268. The prosecution agreed with
the statements in the amicus brief. R.291. Thereafter, without allowing MartinezCastellanos an opportunity to respond to the issues with the assistance of conflict
counsel, the court withdrew its sua sponte notice. Id.
After sentencing, trial counsel filed a motion asking the court to suppress
the evidence based on the "concern that was expressed by the Court in its
Memorandums and the fact that all of the evidence upon which reliance is made
was not fully developed until the time of the trial." R.296-97. Counsel did not
elaborate or support the motion with legal argument. Instead, he attached to the
motion several transcript pages and referenced "a substantial change [in] the

.,
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officer's testimony regarding the reason for the stop and the time and delay in
the stop." R.296. The State opposed the motion as untimely and inadequate, and
the district court denied it. R.382-94. Martinez-Castellanos appealed. R.395-96.
Summary of the Argument
This court should reverse Martinez-Castellanos' convictions for three
reasons. First, Martinez-Castellanos was denied the opportunity to participate in
jury selection and was denied the right to an impartial jury. Under the state and
federal constitutions and the rules of crirnrnal procedure, a defendant has a right
to be present at every stage of trial and to be tried by an impartial jury. MartinezCastellanos was deprived of those rights when his attorney failed to object to the
district court's order excluding him from participating in jury voir dire inchambers. Counsel's conduct constituted ineffective assistance. MartinezCastellanos was not allowed to participate in a critical stage of his trial, to learn
about the individuals who would decide his fate, and to learn that three jurors
expressed experiences and biases affecting their perceptions and abilities to serve
as jurors in this felony case.
Second, Martinez-Castellanos was deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel when counsel failed to file a proper motion to suppress evidence seized
during an unlawfully extended traffic stop. Indeed, defense counsel failed to
address the issue or to file a memorandum supporting a motion to suppress the
evidence even when the district court brought the matter to defense counsel's

12

attention. Counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice because there is
a reasonable likelihood that the district court would have given the issue proper
consideration in Martinez-Castellanos' favor if counsel had presented the
arguments. The case should be remanded for further proceedings on this issue.
Third, the district court committed plain error when it failed to appoint
post-trial conflict counsel to assess whether Martinez-Castellanos received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees the defendant the right to the effective assistance
of counsel at all stages of the criminal proceedings. After the trial, the district
court expressed concerns about the extended detention, and defense counsel's
failure to develop the issue for the court. The court ruled it would appoint
conflict counsel to address the matter. But then, instead of appointing conflict
counsel, the court appointed amicus counsel to present arguments to the court.
Amicus counsel did not represent Martinez-Castellanos and made no effort to
address the extended detention issues. Instead, amicus counsel advised the court
that defense counsel was not ineffective. Had the district court appointed
conflict counsel to analyze the issues there is a reasonable likelihood that the
district court would have given proper consideration to meritorious arguments
to suppress the evidence in this case; and it would have made findings in favor
of Martinez-Castellanos.

,
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Argument

Martinez-Castellanos has addressed three issues. He asks this court to
reverse the convictions and to remand the case for further proceedings based on
the following: first, Martinez-Castellanos was denied the right to participate in
jury selection and was denied the right to an impartial jury; second, Trooper
Sheets unlawfully extended the traffic stop to engage in a criminal investigation
and to search Martinez-Castellanos' car; and third, the district court erred
when-after recognizing that Martinez-Castellanos may have been denied the
effective assistance of counsel during trial- it failed to appoint new counsel to
represent him in post-trial proceedings. Martinez-Castellanos has raised each
issue under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel or plain-error doctrine.
1.

A criminal defendant is entitled to participate in jury selection and to an
impartial jury

A defendant has a fundamental right to be present at every stage of trial.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,338 (1970). This right derives from the Confrontation

Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522,526 (1985) (per curiam);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-08 (1965); U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV; see
also UTAH CONST. art. I,§§ 7,12. It also derives from Utah statutory law. Utah

Code§ 77-1-6(1)(a) (defendant is entitled to appear in person); see also State v.
Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987,989 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (accused "has the right to appear

and defend in person at all stages of trial"). A defendant likewise has the right to
14

a trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV; UTAH CONST. art. I,
§§ 7,12; Utah Code§ 77-1-6(1)(£).
The United States Supreme Court in Gomez v. United States affirmed that
jury selection and voir dire are critical stages of the trial: "the trial commences at
least from the time when the work of empanelling the jury begins." 490 U.S. 858,

,

873 (1989). Indeed, those early stages of the trial are the "primary means by
which a court may enforce a defendant's right to be tried by a jury free from
ethnic, racial, or political prejudice." Id.
As early as 1884, the Supreme Court relied on constitutional provisions
and Utah law to rule that a defendant has the right to be personally present at
trial, and that right extends to being present when the court and counsel question
venire members about potential bias. Hopt v. Utah Territory, 110 U.S. 574,578
(1884). The Hopt Court reiterated that the accused's "life or liberty may depend
upon the aid which, by his personal presence, he may give to counsel and to the
court and triers, in the selection of jurors. The necessities of the defense may not
be met by the presence of his counsel only." Id. 6 The Court relied in part on the
Utah rules for its holding. The rules in effect then - and now - expressly entitle
the defendant to be "personally present at the trial" in a felony case. Id. at 576.7
The Court held that if a defendant is deprived of "his life or liberty without
being so present, such deprivation would be without that due process of law
required by the constitution." Hopt, 110 U.S. at 579.
6

7

In Snyder v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the
defendant's presence at trial is a "condition of due process to the extent that a
fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence." 291 U.S. 97, 107-08

,
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Specifically, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 states that in all cases,
"the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel," and the defendant "shall be personally present at the trial." Utah R.
Crim. P. 17(a). The "trial" includes impaneling a jury. Id. at 17(g).
Rule 18 also supports the defendant's right to be present during voir dire
proceedings. It states that the court "may permit counsel or the defendant to
conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination." Id. at 18(b). Rules 17 and 18 together confirm that jury selection is
part of trial and the defendant is entitled to be present. State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT
45, if33, 48 P.3d 953; State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990,992 (Utah 1982).

In this case, Martinez-Castellanos was not allowed to participate in
portions of the voir dire proceedings and, as a result, he did not learn about the
biases of individuals who were impaneled to serve on the jury. In fact, the
district court excluded Martinez-Castellanos from the jury voir dire, and defense
counsel failed to object. R.428,440:21. Under the circumstances, MartinezCastellanos' rights were violated as follows: First, Martinez-Castellanos was
(1934). The Court has also reiterated that due process ensures the defendant's
right to be present at every stage of trial. See e.g. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730,
745 (1987) (" a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the
criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would
contribute to the fairness of the procedure"); Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526; Allen, 397
U.S. at 338. Moreover, courts have recognized the defendant's right to be present
at every stage of the trial, including jury voir dire. See U.S. v. Alikpo, 944 F.2d 206,
207 (5th Cir. 1991); State v. Carver, 496 P.2d 676, 678-79, 681 (Idaho 1972); State v.
Bird, 43 P.3d 266, 269-73 (Mont. 2002); State v. Irby, 246 P.3d 796, 799-803 (Wash.
2011) (en bane).
16

denied the right to participate in voir dire and jury-selection proceedings and
thereby denied the opportunity to be present at a critical stage of the trial.
Second, because Martinez-Castellanos' counsel failed to object when the district
court excluded him from the process, counsel provided ineffective assistance and
allowed biased individuals to serve on the jury.

,

1.1

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was denied the right to participate in
voir dire and jury-selection proceedings

The district court and defense counsel violated Martinez-Castellanos' right
to participate in jury selection. Martinez-Castellanos was not allowed to attend or
to participate in voir dire proceedings when attorneys asked individual venire
members about their experiences, biases, hostilities, or predispositions. R.440:21.
Moreover, Martinez-Castellanos did not waive his right to participate in those
proceedings and the court did not articulate good cause for excluding him.
Courts have ruled that to waive the constitutional right to be present at
jury selection, the defendant must be informed of the right and mus.t specifically,
voluntarily, and knowingly waive it on the record. See Carver, 496 P .2d at 678-79,
681; Bird, 43 P.3d at 269-73; see also Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 989-90 (a waiver of the
defendant's right to be present at trial must be "voluntary and involve an
intentional relinquishment of a known right"). "To intentionally relinquish the
right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the proceedings," and the
defendant's absence must be voluntary in the sense that "he is free to attend."

State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996).

,
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Likewise, under the Utah rules, a defendant may waive his right to
participate in jury-selection proceedings if he is voluntarily absent after receiving
"notice" of the proceedings; or if the court orders his absence "for good cause
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct." Id. at
17(a); see Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if34 (defendant waived right to be present for
sidebar voir dire when he failed to assert the right; no plain error); Wagstaff, 772
P.2d at 989-90 (defendant intentionally left the state, waiving right to be present).
In this case, the district court conducted jury-selection proceedings in
Martinez-Castellanos' absence but without a waiver and without finding good
cause to do so. Specifically, after the court asked venire members preliminary
and general background questions in open court, 8 it announced that it would
continue the proceedings in chambers. R.440:6-21. The court stated:
Counsel, that concludes the voir dire that I'm going to conduct in
court. For members of the prospective jury, I'm going to take a break
now and meet with counsel in my chambers, and they will
determine any additional questions that they'd like to ask. They may
ask questions of each of you or only some of you. You' re free to
walk about, stretch your legs. Stay in the courtroom, because we
may be calling you .... I will be in a brief recess until we come back
8

The district court obtained information from venire members through
questionnaires and examination in open court before moving the proceedings in
chambers. The questionnaires asked prospective jurors about their employment,
education, general interests, and family. R.461. In open court, the district court
asked prospective jurors to repeat some of that same information. R.440:16-21.
The court then asked venire members to raise their hands if they had close
associations with law enforcement, a victim of crime, or someone with an
experience similar to the conduct described in the information; and to raise their
hands if they had their own experiences with crime or had previously served on
a jury. Id. Although several individuals raised their hands, the court did not ask
them to disclose information at that time. R.440:17.
18

in, which may be in a few minutes. Counsel, if you'll just join me
back in my chambers, I'd appreciate it.

Id. The court and attorneys then retired to the judge's chambers and the court
invited prospective jurors to join them for questioning. During the in-chambers
proceedings, the attorneys asked venire members questions about their
experiences, biases, and abilities to serve on the jury. R.428-31,412-16.
Martinez-Castellanos was not invited to participate in the in-cha1nbers
proceedings. He had no notice of his right to attend, and no opportunity to
choose between attending the in-chambers proceedings or voluntarily
relinquishing his right to be present. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Also, while the
district court excluded Martinez-Castellanos from the proceedings, its order was
not based on" good cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or
obstreperous conduct." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a).
In addition, defense counsel made no effort to protect MartinezCastellanos' rights to participate. Counsel did not notify Martinez-Castellanos of
his rights, did not obtain a waiver, did not object to proceeding in chambers in
Martinez-Castellanos' absence, did not recall any conversation with MartinezCastellanos "about any part of the jury selection process," and did not involve
Martinez-Castellanos in the process. R.428. Thus, Martinez-Castellanos had no
opportunity to understand the proceedings or participate in jury voir dire and
selection. R.428,431,440:21.
During the in-chambers proceedings, prospective jurors revealed

,
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important information. Specifically, Juror Mangelson discussed his years of
experience as a highway patrolman and his assignments relating to drug
interdiction on I-15. R.415. In addition, Mangelson disclosed that he knew the
State's sole witness, Trooper Sheets. Id. Notably, Mangelson failed to make these
basic disclosures in the questionnaire or during voir dire in the courtroom. See
R.461 at 2; see also R.440:9,15-18. Consequently, Martinez-Castellanos had no
opportunity to learn about Mangelson's experiences. R.440:16-18.
Next, Juror Jones disclosed that she was acquainted with someone in law
enforcement. R.413. When the court asked during the in-chambers proceedings
whether she could be fair and impartial, she expressed reservations. R.429. When
the court asked the question a second time, she replied that "she understood
what the judge wanted and she believed she could serve as a juror." Id.
Also, Juror Sachra disclosed that her son had been prosecuted for drugs,
she was "against drugs," and she believed that if a person had drugs in the car,
he was probably guilty. R.415.
The record suggests the district court may have made efforts to rehabilitate
some prospective jurors. R.412-16,428-31. But the record does not support that
these particular jurors were rehabilitated and the law does not support their
rehabilitation. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, il36, 992 P.2d 951 (" a juror's
statement alone that he or she can decide a case fairly ... is not a sufficient basis
for qualifying a juror to sit when the prospective juror's answers provide

20

evidence of possible bias"). In fact, defense counsel did not address issues of bias
or move to strike or remove prospective jurors expressing bias from the panel.
R.428-31. Instead, counsel "passed" the panel and then used peremptory strikes
to remove Bradley, Stevens, Greenhalgh, and Wood for reasons unknown even
to him. 9 R.428. As a result, the court empaneled Jurors Mangelson, Jones, and
Sachra to serve on the jury. R.440:24.
1.2

Martinez-Castellanos' defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance and allowed biased individuals to serve on the jury

Ultimately, defense counsel was responsible for objecting to voir dire and
jury-selection proceedings in Martinez-Castellanos' absence or for requesting
that the district court obtain a proper waiver from Martinez-Castellanos. Counsel
owed a duty of loyalty to Martinez-Castellanos. "Critical to the attorney-client
relationship and the integrity of judicial proceedings is an attorney's duty to
represent the interests of a client with zeal and loyalty. The duty of loyalty is so
essential to the proper functioning of the judicial system that its faithful
discharge is mandated not only by the Rules of Professional Conduct, but also, in
criminal cases, by the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to the

Counsel recalled exercising peremptory strikes against those individuals but
could not recall why. R.428. A review of their questionnaires and courtroom voir
dire yields little information. R.461 at 1,6,9,14. While Greenhalgh answered yes to
a question in the form about whether he or a family member had been a victim of
crime, he did not explain. R.461 at 9. Likewise, Stevens and Bradley answered
yes to whether they or a family member had been criminally charged, but neither
Stevens nor Bradley explained. R.416,461 at 1,6.
9

,
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effective assistance of counsel." State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357,359 (Utah 1994). As
the Utah Supreme Court stated, "defendants are wholly dependent on the
dedication of their attorneys to protect their interests and to ensure their fair
treatment under the law." Id.
Because counsel failed to take measures to protect Martinez-Castellanos'
rights, he provided ineffective assistance. Under the ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel doctrine, Martinez-Castellanos must satisfy a two-part analysis. He must
demonstrate that counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and he must demonstrate prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 691-93 (1984). Martinez-Castellanos has made the showing here.
First, he has demonstrated that counsel's failure to involve him in jury-selection
proceedings constituted deficient performance; second, counsel's conduct fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness because counsel allowed jurors,
who had expressed reservations and bias, to serve on the jury without consulting
Martinez-Castellanos; and third, Martinez-Castellanos was prejudiced by
counsel's deficient performance.
1.2.1

Under the Strickland analysis, defense counsel's failure to
involve Martinez-Castellanos in voir dire proceedings
constituted deficient performance

In establishing deficient performance under the first part of the Strickland
analysis, a defendant is required to "rebut the strong presumption that under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."
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State v. Carter, 2001 UT 96, ,I40, 44 P.3d 626 (quotations omitted). That strong

presumption is rebutted in this case for several independent reasons.
First, the presumption in favor of counsel is rebutted based on a
defendant's constitutional right to participate in the proceedings and the plain
language of rule 17(a). As stated above, absent the defendant's voluntary waiver,

,

the constitution guarantees a defendant's right to be present at trial. Carver, 496
P.2d at 678-79, 681; Bird, 43 P.3d at 269-73; see U.S. v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 125
(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("the court should have held an on-the-record hearing to advise
[the defendant] of his right to be present at voir dire and obtain[] a personal
waiver") Also, the rules expressly recognize the defendant's right to participate
in jury voir dire and selection unless the defendant "voluntar[ily]" absents
himself after notice of the proceedings. Utah R. Crim. P. 17 & 18; supra Arg. 1.1.
The dictionary and Utah courts define the term "voluntary" to mean
"having power of free choice," choosing by design, and intentional conduct. See
www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary /voluntary; Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 990.
The courts recognize that "notice" must be sufficient to advise the defendant that
he is "free to attend." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Thus, the constitutional
guarantee and the rules require more than mere absence and silence to constitute
a voluntary waiver based on "notice." See supra Arg. 1.1. Indeed, if the events
here were sufficient to support notice and voluntary waiver, the constitutional
right and the rule would be meaningless. See Bird, 43 P.3d at 269-72.

,
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Given the defendant's constitutional right to be present and the plain
language of rule 17, counsel's failure to object to the court's decision to engage in
voir dire and jury-selection proceedings outside Martinez-Castellanos' presence
and without consulting with Martinez-Castellanos did not support waiver, but
rather supported inadvertence or neglect, R.428, thereby rebutting any
presumption that counsel's conduct might be considered sound trial strategy. See
Commonwealth v. Shablin, 524 A.2d 511,513 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (concluding that

if defendant's waiver of right to jury trial was not voluntary, then attorney

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel).
Second, the strong presumption in favor of "sound trial strategy" is
rebutted because counsel admitted he failed to involve Martinez-Castellanos in
the process. R.428. While "[c]lose consultation between attorney and client is
essential to the informed exercise of challenges to prospective jurors," Norde v.
Keane, 294 F.3d 401,414 (2d Cir. 2002), counsel did not assess whether defendant

intended to absent himself from the in-chambers voir dire and selection
proceedings. R.428. Consequently, he was not in a position to make reasonable
strategic decisions. See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990) (if counsel
fails to investigate, a decision cannot be considered tactical).
Third, a reasonable lawyer knows that a defendant has the right to be
present when the court and lawyers question those who will decide the case.
State v. Berosik, 214 P.3d 776, 781-82 (Mont. 2009). The defendant has a right to
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learn whether prospective jurors have been victims of crime, have lawenforcement associations, and can be fair and impartial. People v. Marzug, 270
A.2d 945, 945 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
Likewise, a reasonable lawyer knows that "he should have as much
information about the backgrounds of the jurors as possible, so that he can
interrelate this data with his client's history. He must make important
assessments based on that information as to whether selection of a given juror
will be of advantage to his client." State v. Garcia, 620 P.2d 1271, 1274 (N.M. 1980).
A reasonable lawyer will consult his client as to whether or not the jurors
examined are satisfactory; and during the course of the voir dire, the client may
notice something that would suggest a juror is prejudiced against him. "[T]he
rationale behind requiring the defendant's presence during [jury selection] is to
ensure that defendant has knowledge of proceedings and is always readily
available to counsel for input into critical decisions affecting the case." Hardy v.

State, 696 So.2d 1227, 1227 (Fl. Ct. App. 1997).
Because defense counsel here failed to involve Martinez-Castellanos in the
jury-selection process, he violated the duty of loyalty and denied MartinezCastellanos the opportunity to learn that Juror Mangelson had an extensive lawenforcement background, Juror Jones had reservations about her ability to be
impartial, and Juror Sachra had a bias against anyone found with drugs in the
car. Supra, pp. 7-10. The record here fails to support that defense counsel acted as
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a reasonable lawyer. Indeed, counsel's inactions failed to protect MartinezCastellanos' constitutional rights and his rights under Rule 17. MartinezCastellanos has satisfied the first prong of the Strickland analysis.
1.2.2

Defense counsel's conduct fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness when he allowed jurors, who
expressed reservations and bias, to serve on the jury

The record supports that counsel's performance was deficient in another
independent but related way: because counsel failed to involve MartinezCastellanos in the jury-selection process, he failed to give Martinez-Castellanos
the opportunity to consult about the very individuals who would decide his fate
and to learn about the empaneled jurors' experiences and biases. Indeed, counsel
was indifferent and inattentive to the make-up of the jury; he allowed biased
venire members and a longtime sergeant of the Utah Highway Patrol to serve on
the jury without consulting Martinez-Castellanos.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that counsel's decisions about
empaneling jurors are presumed to be "reasonable" and the product of a
"conscious choice or preference." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r20, 12 P.3d 92
(emphasis added). Also, "because the process of jury selection is a highly
subjective, judgmental, and intuitive process," counsel's decision not to remove a
juror is "presumed to constitute effective representation." Id.; see also id. ,r21
(these presumptions are appropriate "because jury selection is more art than
science"). For this reason, "it follows that the decision not to remove a particular
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juror need only be plausibly justifiable, and such plausible justifiability is
ordinarily presumed. In other words, the appellate court will presume that
counsel's lack of objection to, or failure to remove, a particular juror was the
result of a plausibly justifiable conscious choice or preference." Id. if25; see also

State v. Hunt, 2014 UT App 109, if if7-8, 327 P.3d 37.
In Taylor v. State, the court held that the presumption set forth in Litherland
is rebuttable. 2007 UT 12, if 75, 156 P.3d 739. A defendant may rebut the
presumption that counsel made a reasonably effective, conscious, and strategic
choice by showing one of the following circumstances:
(1) that defense counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during the
jury selection process that the failure to remove a prospective juror
was not the product of a conscious choice or preference; (2) that a
prospective juror expressed bias so strong or unequivocal that no
plausibly countervailing subjective preference could justify failure to
remove that juror; or (3) that there is some other specific evidence
clearly demonstrating that counsel's choice was not plausibly
justifiable.

Id. Although Martinez-Castellanos' appeal focuses on his right to be involved in

,

the jury-selection process, he is able to rebut the Litherland/Taylor presumptions
under all three circumstances. Indeed, Martinez-Castellanos has relied on the

Litherland/Taylor standard to demonstrate that, in addition to failing to ensure
that Martinez-Castellanos was allowed to participate in jury selection (supra, Arg.
1.2.1), counsel was inattentive and indifferent in exercising peremptory strikes.
In that regard, Martinez-Castellanos first addresses rule 18, and second he
addresses the Litherland/Taylor standard in the context of the jury in this case.

,
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1.2.2.1

Rule 18

The state and federal constitutions entitle a defendant to the right to be
tried by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV; Utah Const. art. I,§§ 7,
12. To facilitate a defendant's right to an impartial jury, the Utah Supreme Court
has promulgated Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18. The rule allows the district
court to remove a prospective juror "for cause" for several reasons including the
following: the existence of a relationship between a prospective juror and a
witness, when that relationship, "when viewed objectively, would suggest to
reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to
return a verdict which would be free of favoritism"; the prospective juror has
revealed that she "[has] formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as
to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged"; or the
prospective juror has revealed "[c]onduct, responses, state of mind or other
circumstances that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to
act impartially." Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4), (13) & (14).

In West v. Holley, the Utah Supreme Court held that under the rules, voir
dire responses that evidence bias" give rise to a presumption that the potential
juror is biased, and the juror must be dismissed unless that presumption is
rebutted." 2004 UT 97, ,Il4, 103 P.3d 708. If a prospective juror makes a statement
that "facially raise[s] a question of partiality or prejudice," the juror must be
removed by the court "unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds
the inference rebutted." Id. While the inference of bias may be rebutted if the
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prospective juror's statement was "merely the product of a light impression," id.
,r15, a bare assertion or a conclusory statement that the juror "will not be affected

by a particular attitude or will decide the case fairly is not sufficient." Saunders,
1999 UT 59, ,r36. Such a statement may be treated with suspicion if the
prospective juror has made a direct statement of bias. State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35,

,,

,r,r32-33, 24 P.3d 948. The supreme court likewise has cautioned that" strong and

deep impressions which will close the mind against the testimony that may be
offered in opposition to them[,] which will combat that testimony and resist its
force, do constitute a sufficient objection to [a juror]." State v. Julian, 771 P.2d
1061, 1064-65 (Utah 1989).
The supreme court has encouraged district courts to be liberal in removing
prospective jurors from the panel for cause. In Saunders, the court emphasized
the ease with which issues of bias "can be dispensed by the simple expedient of
replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open to
question." 1999 UT 59, ,r51. A district court should view it as a "simple matter to
obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and
selecting another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533,536 (Utah 1981), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994).

1.2.2.2

The Litherland/Taylor Analysis

Based on the above doctrines, and under the Litherland/Taylor analysis,
counsel failed to make reasonable conscious and strategic choices when he failed

,
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to object to or to remove Mangelson, Jones, and Sachra from the jury panel.
First, counsel provided ineffective assistance under Litherland and Taylor
because he was so inattentive or indifferent during jury selection that the failure
to remove jurors was not the product of a conscious choice or preference. "To
establish that trial counsel was inattentive, Defendant must show either' a
specific or clear example of inattentiveness that directly caused the failure to
object to a particular juror, or else show that counsel generally failed to
participate in a meaningful way in the process as a whole."' State v. Alfatlawi,
2006 UT App 511, ifl9, 153 P.3d 804.
A specific example of inattentiveness or indifference involves Juror Sachra.
Counsel was inattentive when she expressed bias. Ms. Sachra "formed or
expressed an unqualified opinion or belief" that if a person has drugs in the car,
he is probably guilty. Utah R. Crim. P. 18; R.415. The prosecution remembered
those comments, while defense counsel was inattentive to them. Compare R.415
with R.430. Indeed, defense counsel took no action that would suggest he was

attentive to a prospective juror who expressed a strong belief before hearing the
evidence. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(13); Wach, 2001 UT 35,

,rip2-34.

Likewise, counsel was indifferent to Ms. Jones' reservations about her
ability to be fair and impartial. After expressing such reservations, the court
asked her again about her ability to function as a juror, and she "replied that she
understood what the judge wanted and she believed she could serve as a juror."
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R.429. Under Utah law, that answer did not resolve the issue. The Utah Supreme
Court has cautioned against seating a juror if she has expressed reservations
about her ability to serve on the jury and is then pressed by the district court to
give a statement for rehabilitation purposes. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(13); Wach,
2001 UT 35, if if33-35. Moreover, a bare assertion suggesting rehabilitation "is not
sufficient." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, if 36. Counsel was either indifferent to the law
ti

or ignorant of it: counsel failed to request further inquiry, failed to make a
motion to remove Ms. Jones, and failed to remove her with a peremptory strike.
Second, counsel provided ineffective assistance under Litherland and Taylor
because the record supports that Ms. Sachra expressed the sort of strong,
unequivocal bias that would cause a reasonable person to second guess counsel's
actions in failing to remove her from the panel. Ms. Sachra stated unequivocally
that she was against drugs and that if a person had drugs in the car, he was
probably guilty. R.415. In the face of those statements, counsel did nothing.
Moreover, no plausible countervailing subjective preference could justify
counsel's failure to remove Ms. Sachra from the panel, and counsel identified no
such preference for Ms. Sachra here. In fact, defense counsel had no recollection
of why Ms. Sachra was allowed to remain and serve on the jury. R.428-29.
Third, counsel provided ineffective assistance under Litherland and Taylor
because the record supports that defense counsel's choice in not objecting to
jurors was implausible and unjustifiable. Specifically, as already stated, defense

.
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counsel had no justification for keeping Ms. Sachra and Ms. Jones on the jury
after they made their disclosures. In addition, counsel had no plausible or
justifiable reason for keeping Sgt. Mangelson on the jury. Counsel revealed that
he kept Mangelson on the jury- notwithstanding his years of service as a
patrolman on I-15, working on cases identical to Martinez-Castellanos' casebecause he had an association with Mangelson when he was a prosecutor, and he
thought Mangelson would hear evidence about the traffic stop and know it was
improper. R.429-30. Counsel's reasons were implausible because under Utah law,
the propriety of the traffic stop was not for the jury to decide; it was for the
district court to decide. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(l)(B), 12(d), 12(e) (a defendant
must raise a motion to suppress to the court before trial). Moreover, counsel did
not ask the jury to find that the traffic stop was improper. R.440:184-96. Based on
the record, defense counsel's reasons for failing to strike the jurors were
implausible and unjustifiable, and they were illogical under the law and
unsupported by counsel's own arguments to the jury.
Counsel's action and inactions constituted ineffective assistance because
Martinez-Castellanos had no opportunity to learn important facts about
prospective jurors, to give input into the process, and to participate. See R.428.
II

Consultation with counsel would have been essential to the informed exercise
of challenges to prospective jurors." Norde, 294 F.3d at 414. Yet, MartinezII

Castellanos was unable to consult with his counsel," and counsel failed to
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advise him" during the course of the examination of those who would decide his
fate." Id. Because counsel failed to involve Martinez-Castellanos in the process,
he was deprived of the right to be present during a critical stage of the trial. Utah
R. Crim. P. 17(a),18(b); Utah Code§ 77-1-6(1)(f); see also U.S. CONST. amends. V,
VI, XIV; UTAH CONST. art. I,§§ 7,12.
1.2.3

Under the Strickland analysis, Martinez-Castellanos was
prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance

Courts have applied different tests to assess prejudice when the defendant
has been deprived of the opportunity to participate in jury voir dire. In Hopt, the
Court considered the error to be "irregular" and to warrant the entry of an order
to vitiate all "subsequent proceedings," even though the defense did not raise the
issue in the trial court. 110 U.S. at 577-79; see Bird, 43 P.3d at 272 (error was
"structural"); People v. Williams, 858 N.Y.S. 2d 147, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
(defendant's absence from jury voir dire constitutes per se reversible error).
Other courts have imposed the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.

Boone v. U.S., 483 A.2d 1135, 1140-42 (D.C. App. 1984); Robinson v. U.S., 448 A.2d
853, 855-56 (D.C. App. 1982); Irby, 246 P.3d at 802-03. That standard places the
burden on the prosecution to prove there was no injury. Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
Under either standard, Martinez-Castellanos is able to establish prejudice.
Under the Hopt standard, the error here was "irregular" and in violation of
constitutional law and Utah law, warranting the entry of an order to vitiate the
33
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convictions. 110 U.S. at 577-79; supra, Arg. 1.1. Under the harmless-beyond-areasonable-doubt standard, prejudice is presumed and the prosecution must
prove no injury, which it cannot do because jurors with biases served on the jury.

See supra Arg. 1.2.2.2.
Because Martinez-Castellanos' counsel failed to object to the irregularity of
the jury-selection process and failed to protect Martinez-Castellanos' right to
participate in that process, Martinez-Castellanos has been forced to raise the
issue of the irregular voir dire proceedings under the ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel doctrine, which requires its own prejudice showing. Under that
prejudice analysis, the defendant must show "a reasonable probability" that with
the effective assistance of counsel, the jury would have had "a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt." State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,

,r,r86, 92-93, 152 P.3d 321. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome; it does not require a defendant to show that counsel's deficient
representation "more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 693-94. Rather, the standard is met if ineffective assistance rendered
the proceeding "unreliable" and hence, "unfair." Id. at 694.
In this case, counsel's ineffective assistance rendered the proceedings
unreliable, and hence unfair, for several reasons. First, Martinez-Castellanos was
not present to give meaningful input regarding decisions about more extensive
voir dire, or about challenges for cause or peremptory strikes. Likewise, because
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Martinez-Castellanos was not allowed to participate in jury voir dire, he was
forced to accept jurors he knew nothing about, and jurors he likely would not
have accepted on the panel, including Mangelson, Sachra, and Jones. Indeed,
Mangelson failed to disclose in his questionnaire and during in-court
questioning that he patrolled 1-15 for several years conducting traffic stops-just
like the stop at issue here. R.440:9,18;461 at 2; see People v. Hunter, 250 A.D.2d 366,
368-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (venireperson disclosed information in bifurcated
voir dire outside defendant's presence and failed to repeat that information in
open court resulting in reversible error).
Second, a biased juror's participation in the trial is prejudicial. See e.g.,

Wach, 2001 UT 35, ,r36 (under the "harmless error" analysis, if defendant
preserved the issue and a juror expressing bias sat on the jury, "the convictions
would have to be overturned"). Juror Sachra revealed a strong bias or impression
when she stated, "if a person had drugs in the car, they were probably guilty."
R.415. She was allowed, nevertheless, to serve on the jury.

,

Third, the juror bias in this case went to the central issue the jury was
required to decide. While Juror Sachra considered a defendant to be guilty if he
had drugs in the car, the jury here was required to decide whether drugs found
in Martinez-Castellanos' car actually belonged to him or not. See R.440:186-92.
Specifically, the State charged Martinez-Castellanos with several offenses,
including two felony offenses for possession of methamphetamine and

,
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hydrocodone. 10 Martinez-Castellanos denied possession of those items. R.41011,425-26. He testified he purchased the car sometime before making the trip to
Utah, the car was very cluttered when he purchased it, he did not have time to
clean it, he was unaware that items of contraband were in the car-specifically,
the methamphetamine and hydrocodone- and he denied that those items
belonged to him. R.425-26,440:144-45. Whether Martinez-Castellanos possessed
methamphetamine and hydrocodone was an issue for the jury, and it was a
foregone conclusion for Juror Sachra even before she heard the evidence. R.415.
Because Juror Sachra's bias had direct bearing on the central issue in the case,
Martinez-Castellanos was prejudiced. State v. King, 2008 UT 54, ,r28, 190 P.3d
1283 (" A defendant who is convicted of a crime by a jury comprised of even one
member who has exhibited actual bias is entitled to a new trial")
There is a reasonable likelihood that a jury free of bias would have given
Martinez-Castellanos' testimony consideration and greater weight, and that such
a jury would have resolved the case differently and more favorably to MartinezCastellanos. Specifically, Martinez-Castellanos admitted he used marijuana
earlier, and he admitted he possessed the marijuana grinder. R.440:'37,143.
However, he denied knowledge of and any intent to use or possess hydrocodone

The State also charged Martinez-Castellanos with misdemeanor offenses
involving weapons, marijuana paraphernalia, and metabolite. R.1-2. MartinezCastellanos acknowledged using marijuana before his trip to Utah, and he
admitted that a marijuana grinder in the car belonged to him. R.440:143.
10
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and methamphetamine, which the State charged as felonies. R.440:143-44. Based
on the testimony and jury instructions, the jury had several paths to choose from
and "[d]epending on which of many paths was chosen, there were several
possible outcomes, some of which may have resulted in conviction, and some of
which may have resulted in acquittal." State v. Moore, 2012 UT 62, if 19,289 P.3d
487. Indeed, a jury free of bias may have convicted Martinez-Castellanos of the
misdemeanor charges and acquitted him of the felony charges.
While it is "unclear what would have happened" if defense counsel had
involved Martinez-Castellanos in jury selection, and it is unclear how a different
jury would have viewed the evidence, those uncertainties support prejudice. Id.

if 21. The question here is whether there was at least a reasonable probability of a
different result had Martinez-Castellanos been allowed to participate in jury voir
dire and selection, and this court should conclude "there was." Id. ,I19.
Because Martinez-Castellanos was not allowed to participate in jury voir
dire, and because defense counsel failed to challenge or to use peremptory

,

strikes against individuals who demonstrated prejudice and bias, MartinezCastellanos was denied the right to participate in a material stage of the trial, he
was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and he was denied the right to an
impartial jury, thereby warranting the entry of an order reversing the convictions
for a new trial. See Williams, 858 N.Y.S.2d 147.
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2.

Trooper Sheets unlawfully detained Martinez-Castellanos for further
investigation and to search the car

Next, Trooper Sheets violated Martinez-Castellanos' Fourth Amendment
rights when he extended the detention beyond the initial purpose of the traffic
stop without sufficient justification. Martinez-Castellanos has raised this issue
under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine because defense counsel
failed to make timely and proper arguments in support of a motion to suppress.
Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Martinez-Castellanos because it
deprived him of the opportunity to have the district court assess and resolve
conflicts in the evidence relevant to the extended stop, and because the evidence
that Sheets discovered during the unlawful detention was the only evidence
supporting the convictions. Under the circumstances, Martinez-Castellanos
addresses the issue as follows: first, the trooper violated his rights with an
unlawful extended detention; second, the evidence the trooper recovered during
the unlawful detention should be suppressed; and third, counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise the issue in the trial court.
2.1

The trooper violated Martinez-Castellanos' rights with an
unlawful extended detention

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,
including unreasonable detentions. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, if 28, 63 P.3d 650.
When an officer stops a vehicle for a routine traffic violation, the occupants are
detained within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The level-two
detention in that instance is reasonable-and thus constitutional-if it satisfies a

38

two-prong assessment. First, the officer's actions in stopping the vehicle must be
justified at inception. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994). Second,
the detention must be "strictly tied to" the circumstances "which rendered [the
detention's] initiation permissible," and must last "no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, if 17, 229 P.3d 650;

,,

State v. Weaver, 2007 UT App 292, if 12, 169 P.3d 760.

If the officer's actions in stopping the vehicle are justified under the first
prong, the officer may engage in a limited inquiry under the second prong as
part of the traffic stop. State v. Adamson, 2013 UT App 22, ififl2-13, 295 P.3d 717.
Once the officer has completed the limited inquiry, he must allow the occupants
to be on their way. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,452 (Utah 1996). Alternatively,
if, during the course of the limited inquiry, the officer forms new reasonable
suspicion for other criminal activity, the officer may extend the detention to
expediently investigate. Baker, 2010 UT 18, if if12-13, 31.
This case involves the officer's actions under the second prong of the
analysis. Trooper Sheets extended the traffic stop here to further investigate
Martinez-Castellanos for substance abuse and to search the car. To justify the
extended detention, Sheets was required to point to specific and articulable facts
for "reasonable suspicion of a further illegality." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, if if31-32;
Baker, 2010 UT 18, if ifl8,43 (evaluating the totality of the circumstances); State v.
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); R.650-51. While the level of
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suspicion "is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
the evidence," the Supreme Court has ruled that an "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch"' is insufficient. U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
7, 15 (1989). In addition, this court will not view the facts in isolation. Baker, 2010
UT 18, ,I44. It will consider the building blocks of facts and reasonable inferences
to determine whether the sum of the whole supports reasonable suspicion. Id.
Sheets articulated two points for the extended detention: MartinezCastellanos' "rapid" 1nanner and his 3-year-old criminal history. R.436:8,440:56.
Notably, and over the course of the proceedings, the trooper changed his
testimony as it related to those points. Specifically, the video of the traffic stop
supports nothing unusual about Martinez-Castellanos' mannerisms and the
trooper admitted that Martinez-Castellanos may have behaved his "normal
way." R.440:56-57,99-100. Also, the 3-year-old history was stale. The sum of the
whole is insufficient to support reasonable suspicion for the extended detention.
2.1.1

Martinez-Castellanos' "rapid" manner

Sheets testified that he extended the detention primarily because of
Martinez-Castellanos' mannerisms. But that evidence is insufficient to justify an
extended detention. In addition, the trooper's testimony is unsupported by the
video of the traffic stop, and it changed at trial. The district court should be given
the opportunity in remand proceedings to assess the evidence under the correct
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legal analysis and under the totality of the circumstances. 11
This court has ruled that certain mannerisms exhibited by a defendant,
when considered alone or even with other factors, fail to support reasonable
suspicion. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (nervous
behavior, together with late hour and high crime area, were insufficient to form
reasonable suspicion); State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(nervousness is insufficient). Courts in other jurisdictions have ruled similarly.

State v. Parker, 723 So.2d 1066, 1069 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("jittery" conduct not
enough); U.S. v. Olson, 59 F.Supp.2d 725, 732 (M.D. Tenn. 1999) (nervous and
rapid mannerisms do not support reasonable suspicion).
Sheets testified during a pretrial motion to suppress hearing that MartinezCastellanos' speech during the traffic stop was "fast" and "jittery." R.436:8.1 2 At
the time of the hearing, Sheets had not released the video of the stop to the
prosecution or defense counsel. R.436:33-35. Then at trial, Sheets stated only that
Martinez-Castellanos had rapid speech and movements. R.440:56-57,99. Those

'
.

11

An order to remand the case for further proceedings is ar,propriate because the
record shows the district court was concerned in post-tria proceedings about
Sheets' reasons for extending the detention. Martinez-Castellanos has addressed
that issue in Arg. 3, infra. Moreover, the district court did not have access to the
traffic-stop recording until trial; and that recording is relevant to an assessment
under the total circumstances. R.436:34-37.
12

Sheets testified at the suppression hearing that he "told [Martinez-Castellanos]
he was bouncing around a little bit." R.436:9. Sheets did not explain himself: he
did not explain if he made the statement to elicit something from MartinezCastellanos or if he actually observed Martinez-Castellanos bouncing or bouncy
driving. Sheets did not repeat the "bouncing" or "jittery" assertion at trial.

,,
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purported facts do not reflect the total circumstances nor do they support new
reasonable suspicion for an extended detention for several reasons.
First, Sheets qualified his observation about "rapid" mannerisms: he
admitted he was not familiar with Martinez-Castellanos and did not know if
rapid manners were his "personal traits," or "personal speech." R.440:101. That
admission is relevant because a court will give weight to an officer's experience,

Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,T49, and Sheets admitted on direct examination that MartinezCastellanos' manner could have been his "normal way." R.440:56-57.
Second, at trial, the trooper referred to the video as reflective of MartinezCastellanos' rapid mannerisms. R.440:99. The prosecution played portions of the
video at trial, and the district court would have reviewed it as well. The video is
objective evidence. It fails to support that Martinez-Castellanos' speech or
manners were rapid or unusual. R.434. In fact, the trooper did most of the talking
and had a very brief interaction with Martinez-Castellanos before he took actions
to extend the stop. See R.460:2-3. Those facts would have been relevant to the
district court under the totality of the circumstances.
Sheets testified at the suppression hearing that he was motivated to
continue the detention because of defendant's manner. R.436:28. But that fact is
insufficient under the total circumstances to support the continued detention.
2.1.2

Martinez-Castellanos' criminal history

Sheets testified that Martinez-Castellanos' criminal record "kind of added
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to [his] suspicions." R.436:28. This court previously ruled that a criminal record
"does nothing to establish that [the defendant] is currently dealing in controlled
substances," particularly if his most recent arrest was "two years prior to the
events in the case at bar." State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);

see also State v. Keener, 2008 UT App 288, ,r12 n.6, 191 P.3d 835 (5-plus year-old

,

arrest record is irrelevant, but 7-month-old history may be part of the
consideration). Brooks involved the probable-cause standard for a warrant.
This case involves the reasonable suspicion standard.1 3 In that context, this
court ruled that a defendant's criminal history "can be a factor in determining
reasonable suspicion" under some circumstances. Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 143. It
can be a factor together with other facts and circumstances if the criminal activity
is "ongoing," as in Humphrey, id., or if the officer has personal knowledge of an
individual's criminal record. U.S. v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.
1980). In Chamberlin, the officer knew the defendant and his companion, and the
officer was personally familiar with their criminal histories. Id. When the officer

'

encountered the men, causing them to flee, the officer's personal knowledge of
their histories supported reasonable suspicion. Id.; see also U.S. v. Johnson, 427
F.3d 1053, 1057 (7th Cir. 2005) (reiterating that a criminal history is only relevant

13

Probable cause and reasonable suspicion differ in terms of the "degree of
suspicion necessary to establish each one." Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 144 n.2. The
standards are alike in that both standards rely on the content of information
possessed by the police and the reliability of that information. Id. at 141.
43
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in conjunction with other information supporting reasonable suspicion); Illinois v.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (suspect' s unprovoked flight upon noticing
police in known drug neighborhood supports reasonable suspicion).
Under the totality of the circumstances, Sheets' reference to MartinezCastellanos' criminal history is unavailing for several reasons. First, the criminal
history is insufficient to support reasonable suspicion even when it is considered
with other factors because the history was three years old, and Sheets admitted
he did not personally know Martinez-Castellanos, his history, or his mannerisms.
R.440:56-57,101; Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 143.
Second, Sheets stated that the criminal history "kind of added to [his]
suspicions," but the history "wasn't the reason" he extended the detention to
further investigate Martinez-Castellanos, supporting the determination that
Sheets relied primarily on information that admittedly was insufficient for him
because he did not know Martinez-Castellanos: that is, he relied on MartinezCastellanos' mannerisms. R.436:28; see supra, Arg. 2.1.1.
Third, as in Brooks and Keener, Martinez-Castellanos' stale history did
nothing to support that" [defendant] is currently dealing in controlled
substances." Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644; Keener, 2008 UT App 288, 112 n.6.
Fourth, if probable cause and reasonable suspicion are alike in that both
standards depend on the content of information possessed by the police and its

degree of reliability (supra n. 13, herein), the quantity and quality of information
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here are insufficient: Sheets observed Martinez-Castellanos' manner and then
admitted at trial that his observations were not reliable because MartinezCastellanos may have been acting normally; also, the criminal history was three
years old. Under the totality of the circumstances, the facts and inferences fail to
support justification for the extended detention.

,

2.1.3

Other factors relevant to the total circumstances

Other factors weigh against the determination that Sheets had reasonable
suspicion to support the extended detention. First, the video recording shows
that Martinez-Castellanos was polite and cooperative. R.434;436:30;460:2-14.
Second, as Sheets continued the detention for further investigation, MartinezCastellanos answered clearly and honestly. R.440:45,65,143;460:3,5
(acknowledging he had an inactive Colorado license and knife; admitting the
empty marijuana grinder belonged to him and that he used medical marijuana
before his trip).
Third, Sheets changed his story. At the motion to suppress hearing and
I

before Sheets released the traffic-stop video, he claimed that MartinezCastellanos' conduct was jittery. R.436:8. At trial, after he released the video to
the defense, he stated that Martinez-Castellanos spoke and moved rapidly and
he referred to the video, which the court would have been able to view. R.440:99.

In addition, Sheets testified at the suppression hearing that he first observed
Martinez-Castellanos and the missing license-plate sticker when he was stopped

,.
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on the northbound shoulder of the Interstate. R.436:31-32. Then at trial, he
testified that he was traveling in the southbound lanes when he made a U-turn to
accelerate to Martinez-Castellanos with lights engaged. R.440:42,93-95.
The district court was concerned by the trial evidence but did not have the
opportunity to address it in a proper motion. R.268 ("based on the testimony
elicited at trial," the court noted Martinez-Castellanos had an argument for a
motion to suppress that counsel failed to pursue); see supra pp. 10-12.
In this case, the totality of the circumstances supports that Sheets
unlawfully extended the detention beyond the purpose of the stop simply to
assess whether rapid speech was Martinez-Castellanos' normal way. R.440:101
("Like I said at the beginning of trial ... I don't know his personal speech. That's
why we get him out and do the field sobrieties to rule that out.").
2.2

Sheets discovered contraband during the extended detention

During the unlawful extended detention, Sheets asked MartinezCastellanos to step out of the car for field-sobriety tests and he discovered items
giving rise to the charges in this case. Supra pp. 5-6. Under the fruit-of-the-

'

poisonous-tree doctrine, that evidence, which came to light as a result of the
unlawful detention, is inadmissible. See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 487-88
(1963).
The inadmissible evidence includes the knives and/ or the box cutter, the
marijuana grinder and lighter, the methamphetamine, the hydrocodone, and the
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other items of contraband that Sheets collected from the car. R.440:5-13.
Martinez-Castellanos respectfully requests that this court remand this case
for further proceedings on the extended detention. Remand will allow the
district court to consider the total circumstances, including Sheets' various
statements about the traffic stop, rapid speech, Martinez-Castellanos' "normal
way," and the video; and to make findings pertinent to the search and seizure
issue. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-89 (Utah 1991) (findings on
suppression issues are necessary to enable meaningful review); R.57,394
(denying pre- and post-trial motions without findings or analysis).
2.3

Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make proper and
meritorious arguments to suppress the evidence

Because defense counsel failed to make arguments in support of a motion
to suppress the evidence as set forth above, Martinez-Castellanos has addressed
this extended-detention issue under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
doctrine. The standard for ineffective assistance is stated supra, Arg. 1.2. See State

v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Martinez-Castellanos is able to
overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct may be considered sound trial
strategy, and he is able to demonstrate deficient performance and prejudice. Id.
2.3.1

Counsel's conduct was deficient

Specifically, under the first prong of the analysis, counsel's conduct was
deficient, not strategic. Counsel was indifferent or ignorant to the facts and the
law and his conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Under
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the law, counsel has a duty "to bring to bear" skill and knowledge to render the
trial "a reliable adversarial testing process." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. He must
stay current on the law. State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688,692 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
He has a duty to make appropriate objections and motions. ABA Stds for Crim.
Justice, Pro. Function & Def. Function (3d ed. 1993) (" ABA Stds"), §§ 4-3.6,4-7.9.
He must consider procedural steps which may be taken in good faith, including
the "obvious step[]" for suppression of evidence. Id. § 4-3.6 & commentary.
In this case, defense counsel failed to bring to bear the skill and knowledge
necessary to present a proper motion to suppress. He was inattentive to the law
and rules, he was untimely, and he failed to protect Martinez-Castellanos' rights.
Specifically, counsel filed an initial motion to suppress referencing "consent." He
presented no argument to support the motion. R.32-33; see Utah R. Crim. P.
12(d)(3). The prosecution opposed the motion and its arguments went
unanswered, prompting the court to deny the motion. R.38-40,42-56,57.
At the time of trial and after trial, defense counsel filed two additional
motions, again without supporting memoranda, and again asking the court to

•

suppress the evidence. R.142-43,296-97. The prosecution opposed those motions
as untimely and deficient under the rules. R.144-45,382-92; Utah R. Crim. P.
12(d). The district court ultimately denied those motions as well. R.394.
The first prong of the analysis is satisfied: The record reveals that while
counsel intended to challenge the evidence in a motion to suppress, he failed to
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,
make timely and proper arguments for suppression of the evidence. Counsel's
actions were "contrary to professional norms," and they "betray[] a lack of the
essential legal knowledge needed to meet the case of the prosecution." State v.
Johnson, 837 A.2d 1131, 1136 (N.J. Super. 2003).

Indeed, if counsel had made a proper motion to suppress, "there would

,

have been 'a full airing of the evidence before trial."' Id. at 1137. That point is
particularly relevant here for several reasons. First, the traffic-stop video is
relevant to a motion to suppress. It shows that Martinez-Castellanos behaved
normally. R.434,460:2-18. The district court viewed it at trial and then expressed
concern with the extended detention. R.268. The district court should be given
the opportunity in remand proceedings to view the "full[y] air[ed]" evidence,
including the video, and to weigh its relevance as part of the analysis.
Second, Sheets admitted at trial that he did not know if MartinezCastellanos' mannerisms were his "normal way" or indicative of something else.
R.440:57. The district court should be allowed to assess that evidence together
with the other circumstances (including the video) and to give that evidence the
weight it deems appropriate.
Third, Sheets changed his story at trial. Compare, e.g., R.436:31-32 with
R.440:42,93-95. The district court should be given the opportunity to weigh
Sheets' testimony under the total circumstances and in light of those facts. Other
courts have ruled that under similar circumstances, the appellate court may
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"remand the matter to ensure, upon proper motion by defendant, a full hearing
of all such evidence." Johnson, 837 A.2d at 1137. This case warrants a hearing to
fully air the evidence. Id.; see infra, Arg. 3.
2.3.2

Counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice

Under the second prong of the analysis, Martinez-Castellanos is required
to show that if counsel had made meritorious arguments for suppression, there is
a reasonable probability that the district court would have made findings to
support his motion, and the verdict would have been different due to the
excluded evidence. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,375 (1986); State v.
Stewart, 2014 UT App 289, if 11, -- P.3d --. Stated another way, a defendant must

demonstrate that a proper motion "would have resulted in suppression of the
evidence." State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, if 17,318 P.3d 238.
Martinez-Castellanos has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that a
proper motion would have resulted in suppression of the evidence. The district
court is uniquely situated to weigh and assess the evidence. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at
787-89. If the court had been given the opportunity to fully consider and weigh

'

the evidence, the court likely would have given little weight to Sheets' assertions
that Martinez-Castellanos exhibited rapid or jittery mannerisms. In the context of
a proper motion, the court would have viewed the total circumstancesincluding the video that shows Martinez-Castellanos behaving normally, and the
trooper's admission that Martinez-Castellanos may have behaved his "normal
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•

,
way" -to rule that Sheets relied on nothing more than a 3-year-old criminal
record and a suspicion or hunch to extend the stop.

If the district court had been allowed to assess those issues, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the court would have made findings to support
Martinez-Castellanos' motion to suppress the evidence, thereby leading to a

,

different result. Indeed, the State prosecuted Martinez-Castellanos based on the
information and evidence Sheets collected only after he extended the detention
for the additional investigation and search. See supra Arg. 2.2. "Given the critical
significance of the evidence to [the State's] successful prosecution," this court
should "find that defendant suffered prejudice from his attorney's failure to
make a timely [and proper] suppression motion.'' Johnson, 837 A.2d at 1136.
3.

The district court denied Martinez-Castellanos the right to the effective
assistance of counsel in post-trial proceedings

A criminal defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at all
stages of the criminal proceedings, including post-trial proceedings. See Kitchen v.

U.S., 227 F.3d 1014, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 2000); Robinson v. Norris, 60 F.3d 457,460

'

(8th Cir. 1995); Baker v. Kaiser, 929 F.2d 1495,1498-99 (10th Cir. 1991); Menefield v.

Borg, 881 F.2d 696,699 (9th Cir. 1989); Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154, 1157 (4th
Cir. 1969); ABA Stds § 4-7.9. A defendant is able in post-trial proceedings to
investigate and present argument on any issue which substantially and
adversely affected his rights. Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). A defendant may even
investigate issues of ineffective assistance at that stage of the proceedings. See
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State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, if 71, 152 P.3d 321.

In this case, the district court set in motion a post-trial investigation under
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 to assess arguments for a meritorious
motion to suppress and to assess ineffective assistance of counsel. R.268. But the
court failed to appoint counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos in the
proceedings. Indeed, the court simply appointed an attorney as amicus to
address one distinct issue for the court, and it allowed the State to address the
issue as well. R.274,279-86. While the court should be commended for its part in
recognizing and calling for post-trial proceedings to address ineffective
assistance, it erred when it failed to appoint conflict counsel to represent
Martinez-Castellanos in a meaningful way. That was plain error.
To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant must establish that" (i)
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). MartinezCastellanos is able to establish each factor under the analysis.
First, an error exists. The district court erred in failing to appoint counsel to

,

represent Martinez-Castellanos in post-trial proceedings to address possible
ineffective assistance of counsel. Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a Motion to
Dismiss because he discovered that the trooper made misstatements at the
pretrial hearing relevant to the initial traffic stop. R.142-43. The district court did
not rule on that motion, but rather filed its own post-trial motion because it had
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,
"a question about [the] suppression hearing issues." R.422. Namely, the court
"was concerned that the evidence was insufficient to allow Trooper Sheets to ask
Mr. Martinez-Castellanos to step out of the car." Id. Also, the court specified that

its concerns about the extended detention were separate from defense counsel's
concerns as expressed in the Motion to Dismiss. R.441:4.

,

The court specified that its concerns arose as a result of "testimony elicited
at trial." Id.; R.422,424-25. And the court set the matter for a post-trial hearing.
At the hearing, the prosecution requested that the district court appoint
conflict counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos. R.441:1. The court agreed to
"appoint[] conflict counsel for purposes of this sua sponte motion" to assess
ineffective assistance of counsel and "specifically" whether the officer had any
justification for extending the stop to "hav[e] [Martinez-Castellanos] step out of
the car and further perform DRE tests or field sobriety tests; whether there was
reasonable suspicion." R.441:6,7-8. The court wanted to know, "was there a
justification to extend the investigation?" R.441:8. The court had a "kernel of
concern" that defense counsel failed to follow up with proper suppression
arguments which "may have had a significant outcome on the case." R.441:13.
II

The court, however, subsequently appointed counsel to serve only as amicus."

See R.279-86. Because Martinez-Castellanos was entitled to the representation of
counsel, even in these unusual sua sponte proceedings, the court erred in
appointing arnicus counsel rather than conflict counsel.
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Second, the error was obvious. A court-appointed amicus does not serve
the same function as a court-appointed attorney for a criminal defendant in a
felony case." An amicus curiae is an officer of the court when so appointed. The
court may appoint an amicus curiae to present argument, to make an
investigation and conduct the hearing in contempt proceedings, and to brief and
present the question of the jurisdiction of the trial court." 3B C.J.S. Amicus Curiae
§

13. An amicus may take action "without reference to the defendant." Id. And an

amicus owes no duty of loyalty to the defendant.
Counsel appointed to assist the defendant, on the other hand, owes such a
duty of loyalty. Holland, 876 P.2d at 359. A defendant is "wholly dependent" on
his appointed counsel to protect his interests. Id.
In this case, when the district court expressed concerns about the extended
detention and defense counsel's failure to argue the issues, it should have
appointed conflict counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos. If the district court
had appointed conflict counsel, the court would have learned that defense
counsel was ignorant of or indifferent to meritorious arguments challenging the
extended detention. See supra, Arg. 2. Indeed, even in post-trial proceedings,
counsel persisted in failing to present timely and proper arguments and he
persisted in failing to address the extended detention. R.296-97,382-92.
The differences between amicus counsel and Sixth-Amendment-appointed
counsel are plain. The district court's failure to appreciate those differences
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interfered with Martinez-Castellanos' right to counsel at a critical stage of the
proceedings; and Martinez-Castellanos was left without representation of
counsel in post-trial proceedings involving the extended detention.
Third, the error was prejudicial. Because the court appointed amicus rather
than conflict counsel, Martinez-Castellanos had no opportunity to address
whether counsel was ineffective for failing to address the issue of the extended
detention. Instead, amicus simply advised the court that defense counsel was not
ineffective because the district court denied the motion to suppress:

[It] is difficult if not impossible to find that Defendant's failure to file
a legal memo rand um could satisfy the second prong of the Strickland
test ... because implicit in the court's denial of the motion to
suppress, with or without a legal memorandum, is a finding and
conclusion of law that the State met its burden in establishing that
the evidence was obtained legally.
R.279-86. The amicus made no effort to address the extended detention or the
evidence presented in the case dealing with the trooper's actions. Id. Yet, as set
forth above, Martinez-Castellanos had meritorious arguments for suppressing
the evidence that defense counsel failed to develop. Supra, Arg. 2. If the court
had appointed conflict counsel, there is a reasonable likelihood that the district
court would have suppressed the evidence. Id. To obviate the error, this court
should remand this case for the appointment of conflict counsel who will
provide the duty of loyalty to Martinez-Castellanos in addressing the search and
seizure issue for the district court's proper consideration.

55

Conclusion

Martinez-Castellanos respectfully requests that this court reverse the
conviction and remand for a new trial, or for further proceedings.
DATED this 8th day of January, 2015.

ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC

Linda M. Jones
Noella A. Sudbury
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
Abisai Martinez-Castellanos
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - JUAB
JUAB COUNTY I STATE OF UTAH

sr.•.TEOFUTA'H
.ll.1 !. :: Ct: IJIH}

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
13 FEB 25 AH 11: 37r0'
...D
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 101600146 FS
Judge:
JAMES BRADY
Date:
February 14, 2013

ABISAI MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS,
Defendant.

•

HLE.9 IN

lHH Cl'.ff·ltiO-:T'ce.un

5~

PRESENT
Clerk:
cindyj
Prosecutor: HOWARD, ANNMARIE T
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HARMON, MILTON T
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 16, 1981 ·
Audio
Tape Count: 11:30:07
CHARGES
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/01/2012 Guilty
2. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/01/2012 Guilty
4 • DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B
Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/01/2012 Guilty
5. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition:,11/01/2012 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE · a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 101600146 Date:

Feb 14, 2013

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 30 day(s) in the Juab County Jail.
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) in the Juab County Jail. The
total time suspended for this charge is 180 day{s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to
a term of 180 day(s) in the Juab County Jail. The total time
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s).
Credit is granted for 15 previously served.

,.
,.

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
All charges are to run concurrent with each other.
!.·

SENTENCE FINE
Charge# 1
Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:
Charge# 2

. Fine: $9533.00
Suspended: $9533.00
Due: $0.00

Charge# 4

Fine: $1933.00
Suspended: $1933.00
Due: $0.00

Charge# 5

Fine: $1933.00
Suspended: $1933.00
Due: $0.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

i

$9533.00
$7651.00
$882.54
$1882.00

$22932.00
$21050.00
$882.54
$1882.00
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month{s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 30 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Juab County Jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1882.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine to The Court.
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Case No: 101600146 Date:

Feb 14, 2013

PROBATION CONDITIONS
Defendant is ordered to enter into an agreement with the Adult
Probation and Parole Department and comply strictly with the terms
of probation.
Defendant is ordered to make himself/herself available to the Adult
Probation and Parole _and to the Court when requested to do so.
Defendant is ordered to not violate the laws of the United States,
the State of Utah, the laws of any state or any municipality.
Defendant is ordered not to use, consume or possess alcohol or
illegal drugs, nor associate with any people using, possessing or
consuming alcohol or illegal drugs and not frequent establishments
where alcohol is the chief item of order.
Defendant is to undergo a substance abuse evaluation and follow
through with the recommended treatment.
Defendant is ordered to provide his high school diploma or complete
his GED.
With Mr. Harmon advising the Court he will be filing a motion for a
new trial, the Court orders the imposition of sentencing stayed for
6 weeks for the motion to be filed and hearing date set.
NOTICE: THE DEFENDANT HAS 30 DAYS FROM TODAY'S DATE TO FILE AN
APPEAL IF HE SO CHOOSES.

Before Judge:
Date:

·9: .

~~~

_,. ,·

Court Judge

•~"f-.~,(~:·r

~~e,';:;i.f':-r-1Individuals needing spec1a':tf~ac2'8minodations (including auxiliary
communicative aids and services) should call CINDY at 435-623-0901
three days prior to the hearing. For TTY service call Utah Relay
at 800-346-4128. The general information phone number is
435-623-0901.
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Am endment IV. Search and Seizure, USCA CONST Amend. IV-Search and Seizure

United States Code Annotated
Constitution of the United States .
A.:nnotated ··
.
.
Amendment IV. Searches and Seizures (Refs & Armos)
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV-Search and Seizure
Amendment IV. Search and Seizure
Curren t:ness

,

<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in four separate documents. Notes ofDecisions for subdivisions
I to XI are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XII to XXIV, see the second document
for Amend. IV-Search and Seizure. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXV to XXXIV see the third document
for Amend. IV-Search and Seizure. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXXV to end, see the fourth document
for Amend IV -Search and Seizure.>
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Notes of Decisions (4444)
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV-Search and Seizure, USCA CONST Amend. IV-Search and Seizure
Current through P.L. 113-209 approved 12-16-2014
End of Document

,

(£')

2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Governmem Works.

\','"'.:"•'. =•. :Next© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

Am endment VI. Jury t rials for crimes, and procedural rights, USCA CONST Am end ....

. United States Code Annotated
Constitution of the United States
Annotated
Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & •.\nnos)
U.S.C.A Const. Amend. VI-Jury Trials
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights
Cuffentness
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in three separate documents. Notes of Decisions for
subdivisions I through XX are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXI through
XXIX, see the second document for Amend. VI. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXX through XXXIII, see
the third document for Amend. VI.>
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Notes of Decisions (5159)
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury Trials, USCA CONST Amend. VI-Jury Trials
Current through P.L. 113-209 approved 12-16-2014
End of Document

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text
AMENDMENTXIV.CffiZENSHIP;PRlVILEGESANDIMMUNITIES;DUE
PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION;
DISQUALlFICA.TION OF OFFICERS; PUBLlC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT

Currentness
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equa~ protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. Toe validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States,
or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. Toe Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
<Section 1 of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,>

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § I-Citizens>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § I -Privileges>
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AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENS HIP; PRIVILEGES AND ... , USCA CONST Amend ....

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Due Proc>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ I-Equal Protect>
<sections 2 to 5 of this amendment are displayed as separate documents,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 2,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 3,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 4,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 5,>

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text, USCA CONST Amend. XIV-Full Text
Current through P.L. I 13-209 approved 12-16-2014
End of Document

{'.) 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim IO original U .S. Government Works.
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Sec. 7. [Due process of law], UT CONST Art. 1, § 7

West's Utah Code Annotated
Constitution of Utah
Article I. Declaration of Rights
U.CA 1953, Const. Art.

1, § 7

Sec. 7. [Due process of law]
Currentness
No person shall be deprived oflife, liberty or property, without due process oflaw.

,
Notes of Decisions (624)
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 7, UT CONST Art. 1, § 7
Current through 2014 General Session.
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Sec. 12. [Ri ghts of accused persons], UT CON ST Art. 1, § 12

West's Utah Code Annotated
Constitution of Utah
Article I. Declaration bf Rights ·
U.C.A

1953,

Const. Art. 1, § 12

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]
CmTentness

,

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial
by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in
all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the
use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as
defined by statute or rule.

Credits
Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995.

Notes of Decisions (1504)
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12, UT CONST Art. 1, § 12
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-1-6
§ 77-1-6. Rights of defendant

Currentness
(I) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:

(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;

(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;

(c) To testify in his own behalf;

(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;

(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf;

(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is alleged to have been committed;

(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and

(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if
unable to post bail and if the business of the court permits.

(2) In addition:

(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;

(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by
the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;

(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against him.self;

(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his wife; and
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§ 77-1-6. Rights of defendant, UT ST§ 77-1-6

'

( e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a
court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate.

Credits
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2.
Codifications C. 1953, § 77-1-5.

Notes of Decisions (234)
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-1-6, UT ST§ 77-1-6
Current through 2014 General Session.
End of Document

Ii;) 2015 Thomson Reuters. Ko claim to original U.S. Government Works .

'/c -'c·:·.'?·::Next © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

2

I

RULE 17. THE TRIAL, UT R RCRP Rule 17

West's Utah Code Annotated
Rules•.
.. State. Court
. .
Utah Rules of C1iminal Procedure
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17
RULE 17. THE TRLi\L

CmTentness

,

(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions:

(a)( 1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence;

(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have
the same effect as if defendant had been present; and

(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous,
or obstreperous conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial.

(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order:

(b)(l) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;

(bX2) felony cases when defendant is in custody;

(b )(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and

(b)(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.

(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court and
the consent of the prosecution.

( d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the
court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.
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(e) In all cases, the number of members ofa trial jury shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953.

(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation
in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of jurors less
than otherwise required.

(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following order:

(gXl) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;

(gX2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may make an opening statement or reserve
it until the prosecution has rested;

(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;

(gX4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;

(gX5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits;

(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and

(gX7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the
argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument The court may set
reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument

(b) Ifa juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using
the alternate juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining.
Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered.

(i) Questions by juro rs. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a witness as provided in this section.

(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its role
as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from a juror
and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time.

(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the jurors that they may write the question as it
occurs to them and. submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the jurors that some
questions might not be allowed.
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RULE 17. THE TRIAL, UT R RCRP Rule 17

(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the question.
The judge may disallow a question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question in the
court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The
question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the witness
after the juror's question.

G) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an
officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall
be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak to them
nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a
specified time.

(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by
the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by,
any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case
is fmally submitted to them.

(I) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been

received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits
of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take
notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall provide jurors with
writing materials and instruct the jury on taking and using notes.

(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some convenient place under charge of an
officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the court,
the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except
to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person
the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.

•

(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury
be brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry
or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion
respond to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response
thereto shall be entered in the record.

(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or
the jury may be sent out again.

(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof: upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense.
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'

Credits
[Amended effective November l, 2001; November l, 2002.)

Editors' Notes
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Paragraph ([). The committee recommends amending paragraph (l) to establish the right of jurors to take notes and to have
those notes with them during deliberations. The committee recommends removing depositions from the paragraph not in order
to permit the jurors to have depositions but to recognize that depositions are not evidence. Depositions read into evidence will
be treated as any other oral testimony. These amendments and similar amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure will make
the two provisions identical.

'
Notes of Decisions (329)
Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 17, UT R RCRP Rule 17
Current with amendments received through 11/15/14
End of Document

0 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to 01iginal U.S. Government Works.

\'ic;'.":-:'.5·- ·.Nexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

4

•

RULE 18. SELECTION OF THE JURY, UT R RCRP Rule 18
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 18
RULE 18. SELECTION OF THE JURY
Currentness
(a) The judge shall determine the method of selecting the jury and notify the parties at a pretrial conference or otherwise prior
to trial The following procedures for selection are not exclusive.

( a)(l) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional
number as will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for cause granted. At
the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause
during the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine
challenges for cause outside the hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to
fill the vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived.
The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any
alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the
last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.

(a)(2) Struck method The court shall summon the number of jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as
will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause granted. At the direction
of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during the
course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges
for cause outside the hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall provide a list of the
jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at
a time in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors,

•

or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names
are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.

(a)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order by computer, the clerk may call the jurors in that
random order.

(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct
the examination. In the latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examination by such
further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or
the defendant Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make a prelimmary statement of the case. The court may permit the
parties or their attorneys to make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of trial
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RULE 18. SELECTION OF THE JURY, UT R RCRP Rule 18

(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror.

(c)(l) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the trial ofa particular action. A challenge to the
panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party.

(c )(I Xi) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to
the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the panel.

(c)(lXii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and shall be in writing or made upon the record. It
shall specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge.

(c)(l)(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon
which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing thereon.

(c)(l)(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far
as the trial in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors to proceed.

( c )(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made
only before the jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror is sworn
but before any of the evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be talcen first by the prosecution and then by the defense.

(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled
to 1O peremptory challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases,
each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defendants
additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.

(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard and determined by the court. The juror challenged
and any other person may be examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may be talcen on
one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the court may remove a juror upon the same grounds.

(e)(I) Want of any of the qualifications prescn"bed by law.

(e )(2) Any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of performing the duties of a juror.

( e)(3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose
complaint the prosecution was instituted.

( e)(4) The existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror and any party,
witness or person alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively,
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RULE 18. SELECTION OF THE JURY, UT R RCRP Rule 18

would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would
be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because the juror is indebted to or employed by the
state or a political subdivision thereof.

(e)(5) Having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having complained against or having been
accused by the defendant in a criminal prosecution.

(e)(6) Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment

(e )(7) Having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the particular offense charged.

(e )(8) Having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged
without a verdict after the case was submitted to it

( e)(9) Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act charged as an offense.

(e )(10) If the offense charged is punishable with death, the juror's views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially
impair the performance of the juror's duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions of the court and the juror's oath in
subsection (h).

(e )(11) Because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or interested in carrying on any business, calling
or employment, the carrying on of which is a violation oflaw, where defendant is charged with a like offense.

(e)(12) Because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on the preliminary examination or before the
grand jury.

( e)(I3) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged.

•

(e}(l4) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not
likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is. convinced the juror can and will
act impartially and fairly.

(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall
be completed before peremptory challenges are taken.

(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace
jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The
prosecution and defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen. Alternate
jurors shall be selected at the same time and in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, and privileges as principal

•
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RULE 18. SELECTION OF THE JURY, UT R RCRP Rule 18

jurors. Except in bifurcated proceedings, an alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged when the
jury retires to consider its verdict. The identity of the alternate jurors may be withheld until the jurors begin deliberations.

(h) When the jwy is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well
and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence and the instructions
of the court.

Credits
[Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2007.J

Editors' Notes

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Paragraph (b). The preliminary statement of the case does not serve the same purpose as the opening statement presented after
the jury is selected. The preliminary statement of the case serves only to provide a brief context in which the jurors might more
knowledgeably answer questions during voir dire. A preliminary opening statement is not required and may serve no useful
purpose in short trials or trials with relatively simple issues. The judge should be particularly attuned to prevent argument or
posturing at this early stage of the trial.
Paragraph (e)(l4). The Utah Supreme Court has noted a tendency of trial court judges to rule against a challenge for cause in
the face of legitimate questions about a juror's biases. The Supreme Court limited the following admonition to capital cases,
but it is a sound philosophy even in trials oflesser consequence.
[W]e take this opportunity to address an issue of growing concern to this court. We are perplexed by the trial courts' frequent
insistence on passing jurors for cause in death penalty cases when legitimate concerns about their suitability have been raised
during voir dire. While the abuse-of-discretion standard of review affords trial courts wide latitude in making their for-cause
determinations, we are troubled by their tendency to "push the edge of the envelope," especially when capital voir dire panels
are so large and the death penalty is at issue. Moreover, capital cases are extremely costly, in terms of both time and money.
Passing questionable jurors increases the drain on the state's resources and jeopardizes an otherwise valid conviction and/
or sentence . ... If a party raises legitimate questions as to a potential juror's beliefs, biases, or physical ability to serve, the
potential juror should be struck for cause, even where it would not be legally erroneous to refuse. State v. Carter, 888 P.2d
629 (Utah 1995).

In determining challenges for cause, the task of the judge is to find the proper balance. It is not the judge's duty to seat a jury
from a too-small venire panel or to seat a jury as quickly as possible. Although thorough questioning of a juror to determine
the existence, nature and extent of a bias is appropriate, it is not the judge's duty to extract the "right" answer from or to
"rehabilitate" a juror. The judge should accept honest answers to understood questions and, based on that evidence, make the
sometimes difficult decision to seat only those jurors the judge is convinced will act fairly and impartially. This higher duty
demands a sufficient venire panel and sufficient voir dire. The trial court judge enjoys considerable discretion in limiting voir
dire when there is no apparent link between a question and potential bias, but "when proposed voir dire questions go directly to
the existence of an actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must allow such inquiries." The court should ensure
the parties have a meaningful opportunity to explore grounds for challenges for cause and to ask follow-up questions, either
through direct questioning or questioning by the court.
The objective of a challenge for cause is to remove from the venire panel persons who cannot act impartially in deliberating
upon a verdict The lack of impartiality may be due to some bias for or against one of the parties; it may be due to an opinion
about the subject matter of the action or about the action itself. The civil rules of procedure have a few-and the criminal rules
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many more-specific circumstances, usually a relationship with a party or a circumstance of the juror, from which the bias of
the juror is inferred. In addition to these enumerated grounds for a challenge for cause, both the civil rules and the criminal rules
close with the following gr~unds: formulation by the juror of a state of mind that will prevent the juror from acting impartially.
However, the rules go on to provide that no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed an opinion upon
the matter if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the person will, notwithstanding that opinion, act impartially.
The amendments focus on the "state of mind" clause. In determining whether a person can act impartially, the court should
focus not only on that person's state of mind but should consider the totality of the circumstances. These circumstances might
include the experiences, conduct, statements, opinions, or associations of the juror. Rather than determining that the juror is
"prevented" from acting impartially, the court should determine whether the juror "is not likely to act impartially." These
amendments conform to the directive of the Supreme Court: If there is a legitimate question about the ability of a person to act
impartially, the court should remove that person from the panel
There is no need to modify this determination with the statement that a juror who can set aside an opinion based on public
journals, rumors or common notoriety and act impartially should not be struck. Having read or heard of the matter and
even having an opinion about the matter do not meet the standard of the rule. Well-informed and involved citizens are not
automatically to be disqualified from jury service. Sound public policy supports knowledgeable, involved citizens as jurors. The
challenge for the court is to evaluate the impact of this extra-judicial information on the ability of the person to act impartially.
Information and opinions about the case remain relevant to but not determinative of the question: ''Will the person be a fair
and impartial juror?"

In stating that no person may serve as a juror unless the judge is "convinced" the juror will act impartially, the Committee uses
the term "convinced" advisedly. The term is not intended to suggest the application of a clear and convincing standard of proof
in determining juror impartiality, such a high standard being contrary to the Committee's objectives. Nor is the term intended
to undermine the long-held presumption that potential jurors who satisfy the basic requirements imposed by statutes and rules
are qualified to serve. Rather, the term is intended to encourage the trial judge to be thorough and deliberative in evaluating
challenges for cause. Although not an evidentiary standard at all, the term "convinced" implies a high standard for judicial
decision-making. Review of the decision should remain limited to an abuse of discretion.
This new standard for challenges for cause represents a balance more easily stated than achieved. These amendments encourage
judges to exercise greater care in evaluating challenges for cause and to resolve legitimate doubts in favor of removal. This
may mean some jurors now removed by peremptory challenge will be removed instead for cause. It may also mean the court
will have to summon more prospective jurors for voir dire. Whether lawyers will use fewer peremptory challenges will have
to await the judgment of experience .
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Notes of Decisions (273)
Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 18, UT R RCRP Rule 18
Current with amendments received through 11/15/14
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